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Nontechnical Summary
by Ashley Moore
The state of Connecticut has been severely impacted by the recent financial crisis,
perhaps more greatly than other states. It was our objective to apply the skills we have
acquired as an undergraduate class in Economic Forecasting at Sacred Heart University
in Fairfield, Connecticut, to compare various economic indicators and trends of the State
of Connecticut to those of the United States. We ultimately wanted to evaluate the real
Connecticut economy, labor market developments, public sector, housing market and
financial sector to determine the direction Connecticut fiscal policy should be steered in
the future. The six groups of students were allotted a particular part of the economy to
further investigate through statistical and literary research. Ultimately, we used our
resources and statistical software to develop the forecasts throughout this paper.
Our findings indicate that the real economy of Connecticut is improving, although
at a slower rate than the overall nation. Although the State has generated the same gross
domestic product (GDP) growth as the nation in 2012 at 2.5%, our baseline scenario
analysis indicates GDP growth in Connecticut will dip to about 2.3% in 2013 but increase
a tenth of a percent each year until it reaches 2.5% in 2015. Our estimation output shows
that worst-case scenario state growth would be 1.8%, by 2015 and best-case scenario
growth would be 3.2% by 2015. Despite the appeal of a 3.2% growth projection, we feel
as if reforms in the state economy as well as elevated tax rates both on households and
businesses relative to the majority of the nation will cause a more stagnant growth than
3.2%.
Inflation in the State, as well as the nation, has been subdued thus far. Inflation
estimates calculated in this forecast are based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
Intuitively, we are anticipating an increase in CPI during the periods 2013-2015 due to
the current monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, as well as a steady increase in real
aggregate demand. Our numbers indicate an increase in inflation from 2.1% in 2012 to
2.5% in 2013, 3.2% in 2014 and 3.4% in 2015. However, we feel as if by the latter part of
our forecast, inflation numbers we be driven by the spending and dis-saving of both
consumers and business. Additionally, banks and small businesses are likely to feel
profitability tighten as inflation adjusted lending interest rates will be minuscule.
The unemployment rate is a major economic indicator in constant limelight and
currently, scrutiny. Whether uttered throughout the media or the basis of a political
debate, the unemployment rate since the financial crisis has soared to distasteful numbers.
In 2012, the state unemployment rate of the civilian labor force was 8.0%, which
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exceeded the overall US economy unemployment. This high level reflects through
structural state reforms that are discussed further throughout the paper. Such a high level
of unemployment is also due to high taxation in the state. Taxation on properties in most
of Connecticut townships is rising at a rapid pace, as well as high taxation on business
profits. Historically, the state’s unemployment has followed a strikingly similar pattern
post-recession. Under the assumption that this pattern will hold as the state climbs out of
the recent recession, we project unemployment to drop to 7.2% by year-end 2014, and
6.8% by year-end 2015.
While Connecticut seemed to fair better during the recent financial crisis than the
rest of the United States, it was not able to escape the housing bubble unscathed. The
financial crisis’ effects of this were noticeable across the entire housing market, as it
affected housing starts, home ownership, home vacancy and housing prices. In the
aftermath of the crisis, as of the beginning of 2013, single-family homes rose
significantly since early 2012, deposits on condominiums rose nearly 30% - the highest
level in three years, and financial institutions have begun approving more housing loans.
Median home prices have stabilized after a full year of consistent growth in both the
number of deposits and closings. We believe the consistent growth period that
Connecticut has seen over 2012 is important as it will drive the housing market back
towards equilibrium for the periods of 2013-2015. On the other hand, 2013 also had some
negative indicators for the housing market. The rental market saw nearly 3% less leases,
foreclosures are on the rise, and more people are leaning towards more affordable homes
rather than the large luxury home market the state possesses. Because there is a clear
mixture of positive and negative feedback from the first quarter of 2013, we believe a
reasonable forecast would be slight growth in 2013 due to forecasted decreasing rates of
unemployment, and more growth in 2014-2015 as the housing market and economy
slowly reach an equilibrium.
The financial crisis has had an effect on banks at the local, state, and national
level. Many banks faced solvency issues, causing an epidemic of filed bankruptcies
across the banking sector. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued Basel II
and Basel III scenarios, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations.
These were intended to create an international standard for banking regulators to control
how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and
operational risks banks face. Currently, commercial banks are meeting Basel III
standards, but not by much. There is still much more room to increase solvency within
our commercial banks. Connecticut commercial banks have been more profitable for a
few reasons. Firstly, since the outbreak of the recent financial crisis in Q3 2007, there has
been 483 failed or government assisted banks, zero of which have taken place in
Connecticut. Commercial banks are most likely to remain profitable after the Federal
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Reserve announced on May 1st 2013 that they would continue their asset-purchasing
program of purchasing $85 billion of treasuries and mortgage-backed securities each
month into 2014.
As many of us are students graduating entering the work force in the tri-state area,
we feel recognizing the issues and taking steps to better the state economy should be top
priority because it will help open doors for future students to seek employment after they
complete their education in order to pay back debt and contribute to the economy. The
highly service-driven economy of Connecticut faced harsh repercussions from the
financial crisis, however; hopefully new laws and regulations will help to prevent a
similar crash in the future. In order to fully protect itself from such an occurrence, we feel
that Connecticut needs to work towards creating more of a manufacturing sector, like it
once had. By focusing on the diversification of the labor market and making the State a
more business-friendly environment, we hope that Connecticut’s economy will return to a
prosperous state.
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I. Outlook for the Real Economy of Connecticut
by Anna Kadlof & Suzanne May
Forecast Summary
The current economic condition of Connecticut is improving since the recent
financial crisis. When compared at the national level, Connecticut has been recovering at
a slightly slower pace.
Real Gross State Product:
Based on our estimation, the State real economy, i.e. real gross domestic product, grew at
the annual rate of 2.5% in 2012, which was exactly the same as the rate of growth of the
US economy. Our models, which technical features are described below, imply that the
State real GDP will grow at a somewhat slower pace of 2.3% in 2013. It will modestly
accelerate to the growth rate of 2.4% in 2014 and 2.5% in 2015. The low-growth
scenario implies the rate of growth of 1.8% by 2015, and the most optimistic scenario
suggests 3.2%. However, considering the ongoing structural changes in the State
economy accompanied by the high overall taxation of households and businesses relative
to the overwhelming majority of US states, the high-growth scenario seems extremely
unlikely.
Inflation (Based on State CPI):
Just like in the national US economy, inflation in the State has been so far subdued.
However, we anticipate the rate of increase in consumer price index to accelerate during
the period 2013-2015. Our data show that the rate of inflation based on the year-on-year
changes in the State consumer price index was 2.1 % in 2012. We expect it to increase to
2.5% in 2013, 3.2% in 2014 and 3.4% in 2015. The ongoing highly accommodative,
“ultra-easy” monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, along with a modest increase in real
aggregate demand should contribute to acceleration in the rate of inflation. The expected
inflation for the end of our forecast period will likely stipulate dissaving by consumers
and businesses. It will put a squeeze on profitability of banks and most of small
businesses as real (inflation adjusted) interest rates will likely move to a decisively
negative territory.
Unemployment:
The State unemployment rate of the civilian labor force was 8.0%. Its high level that
exceeds the overall rate for the US economy reflects the ongoing, deep structural changes
that we elaborate below. It unfortunately also reflects high overall taxation in the State,
particularly high, and rising at a fast pace property taxation in the majority of Connecticut
townships, as well as high taxation of business profits. The Connecticut unemployment
adjustment patterns following recessionary periods display a remarkable similarity, as
shown on the graph below. Assuming a similar response to the recent recession and
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running the technical forecast specified below, we expect that the unemployment rate will
decline to 7.2% by the end of 2014 and 6.8% by the end of 2015.

Models and Technical Explanations
After running a least square regression for the state of Connecticut real GDP, it was
determined that the regression is optimized at ARMA(4,2). The ARMA(4,2)
regression had an AIC of 18.52268. However, only the constant was significant in
this regression. From this model we were able to forecast real GDP. It was a stable
forecast because the Theil Inequality Coefficient was 0.013211, very close to the
targeted value of 0. The bias 0.001510 and variance proportion 0.123239 were
minimized while the covariance portion 0.875251 was maximized. Thus, this is a
robust forecast, which is depicted below in graph 1. Our forecast depicts that
Connecticut’s economy and real GDP is to continue to rise. This slow recovery may
be due to Connecticut’s heavy reliance on the financial services industry for the
states GDP.
Table 1:
MA\AR
0
1
2
3
4

0
20.77298
20.15656
20.47908
20.03395

1
20.21623
20.27830
19.85623
19.91713
19.55602

2
20.39676
20.13925
20.20479
20.41781
20.26706

3
20.31630
20.40457
20.08749
20.22254
19.511591

4
20.54312
20.52884
18.52268
20.04131
20.07010

8

Graph 1:
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After examining the change in real GDP in Connecticut we were able to
optimize the equation using ARMA(4,3) (Table 1). That is, the residuals for
Connecticut real GDP are dependent on the last three periods, and the values are
affected by the past four periods. This regression had an AIC of 19.11152, greater
than the Connecticut real GDP regression, suggesting that the previous regression
using real Connecticut GDP is more robust. We were unable to forecast this
regression due to lack of data.
Table 2:
MA\AR
0
1
2
3
4

0
20.39684
20.31610
19.75265
20.42669

1
20.53363
20.43046
20.25574
19.94537
20.37809

2
20.64168
20.38993
20.42948
20.29519
20.47079

3
20.55539
20.71612
20.28803
20.36441
20.88234

4
20.86937
21.04154
21.02470
19.11152
21.15662

In addition to this regression, we also conducted a time trend analysis. In this
analysis we found that the quadratic version of the regression was more ROBUST.
Both the trend, and the @trend component are significant at the 1% level. The AIC
for just the @trend component was 20.64586, while also including the @trend^2
the AIC was 20.09412. However, this AIC is worse then the original regression run
with ARMA(4,2).
In addition to Connecticut real GDP and the change in Connecticut GDP, we
also examined the rate of unemployment in both Connecticut and the United States.
Below is graph 2, a scattergram of real GDP growth versus unemployment. This
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graph suggests that as unemployment grows, real GDP for Connecticut will decline
as well.
Graph 2:

Real GDP Growth Rate vs Unemployment Rate
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When graphing the Connecticut Unemployment rate vs. the national
unemployment rate (graphs 3&4), we found that the Connecticut unemployment
rate has surpassed the national level. Viewing the quarterly data, Connecticut
unemployment rate was below the national rate up until the first quarter of 2011.
However, by the second quarter the unemployment rates were equal, and by the
third quarter Connecticut’s unemployment rate again dipped below the national
level. Then again in second quarter 2012, the Connecticut unemployment rate has
surpassed the national unemployment rate and has been continuously. Despite
these fluctuations, after viewing the graph it is evident that both Connecticut and
the national rate of unemployment are following a somewhat similar trend. In this
graph, it is also evident that both the Connecticut unemployment rate and the
national unemployment rate are trending towards the natural rate of
unemployment.
Graph 3:
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In addition to quarterly data, we also examined the annual unemployment
data for Connecticut and the United States. Since 1995, the Connecticut
unemployment rate has been less than the national unemployment rate right up
until 2010, when the annual Connecticut unemployment rate surpassed the national
unemployment rate by 1.1%. This is a disappointment for Connecticut considering
unemployment rate measures the relative economic performance of the state, and
by this standard the local economy of Connecticut is weakening, just like the US as a
whole. However, Connecticut unemployment rate seems to follow the trend of the
US unemployment rate therefore we feel that Connecticut will also experience a
decrease in unemployment.
Graph 4:
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When running Connecticut unemployment as a function of real GDP, we
found that real GDP is significant at the 10% level. Its coefficient was significantly
small, 7.27 x 10^-5. This means that a $1,000,000 increase in real GDP, will lead to a
0.0000727% increase in unemployment, which is counterintuitive. This however is
most likely caused by the small sample size, for this regression was run using annual
data, for quarterly data for Connecticut real GDP was unavailable.
Also when examining Connecticut exports with national exports in graph 5, it
is evident that Connecticut’s exports follow a similar upward trend as US exports. As
you can see, the slope is very shallow, representing the demise of manufacturing.
Graph 5:
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In addition, we calculated inflation using two different methods. One using
CPI and the other using changes in GDP, depicted below in graph 6. We found that
when using the CPI method, it gave a more accurate description of the inflation in
Connecticut. At the end of 2009, the US economy experienced a period of deflation.
This is mirrored in the graph modeled by change in CPI, where as the inflation
indicator calculated by GDP shows deflation at approximately 1% during the time
period.
Graph 6:

13

4

3

2

1

0

-1
96

98

100

102

104

INFCPI

106

108

110

112

114

INFGDP

Overall, the economic outlook for the real economy is improving. Connecticut
has been on the rise in terms of GDP, reducing unemployment, and closer to the
targeted inflation. Although this is positive news for Connecticut, these
improvements have only been gradual, especially when compared to the US
economy as a whole.
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II. Structural Changes in Connecticut Economy – A Ten-Year Perspective
by Elisabeth Pitruzzella and Corinne Lajoie
Connecticut experienced sudden rise in unemployment in years 2002 and 2003
and again in 2009 and 2010. These unemployment fluctuations and the related discussion
is the focus of our study. We looked at the unemployment trend in Connecticut and
compared it to the USA level rates. Further, we also looked at the trends in the GDP
growth at these two levels and tried to deduce the reasons behind the jumps in
unemployment. Lastly, we used time series forecasting to analyze the unemployment rate
in Connecticut and investigate whether the unemployment rate will follow upward or
downward trend in coming months.
Throughout this section of the paper we will analyze the unemployment trends
both nationally and statewide, discuss the data and methodology used in our analysis, and
discuss our results and policy recommendations.
Recent Trends in Unemployment
The unemployment rate in Connecticut was significantly lower than the national
unemployment level until 2002, which can be seen in the graph below. As we can see, the
red line representing the Connecticut unemployment rate starts well below the United
States unemployment level in 2000 and went beyond the national level for the first time
in 2011. The rather irregular patterns in unemployment rate in Connecticut can be
generally characterized by a rising unemployment phase, followed by a rather sedate or
falling phase. However, since the state of Connecticut started facing rising
unemployment rates in 2007, it has not since hit the downward or plateau phase that it
has historically faced in the past.
12.0
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8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0

UNEMP_USA

2011

2010

2009

2008
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2000

Unemployment Rate

UNEMP_CONN

We also looked at the GDP trends to see how the state and national economies
have been performing in general. It is interesting to note from the graph below that while
the GDP growth in Connecticut has been on the lower side of that of the national level, it
was higher than the national level in 2009 and 2010 - years of deep recession.
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Connecticut’s GDP contracted by 3% in 2011, which adversely affected employment
rates during that time. The significant decrease in economic activity may be reflective of
high inflation in 2011. The unemployment rate has been rising for some time now; the
current state of unemployment is alarming.
In the next section, we formulate a methodology to forecast the unemployment rate in the
next few months and analyze the output.
Data and Methodology
The data is sourced from Federal Reserve Economic Data - FRED - St. Louis Fed. The
variable being studied is Connecticut’s unemployment rate. The data series is monthly in
nature and ranges from January 1976 to January 2011. Our objective is to discover the
unemployment rate until June 2011 and observe the trend.
First, we plot the unemployment series to look for a trend. The graph below shows the
trend in the unemployment rate over the entire data period. We see that the series is not
following any particular trend. To check for the stationarity of the series, we run the
Augment Dickey-Fuller test and the Philips-Perron test. However, the test statistics from
both the test show that the data series is not stationary. This brings us to our next step of
analysis whereby we try to make the data series stationary for further analysis.
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We take the first difference of the unemployment data and plot it against time to
graphically check for stationarity.
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The graph above shows the graph of first difference of unemployment against time. It is
evident that this data series is stationary in nature. This is confirmed by the results of
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron tests which reveal that the differenced
series is stationary at 1% level of significance.
Now that we have a stationary series, we go on to determine the model to be used. Based
on the ACF and PACF as well as the AIC and SBIC criteria, we select two lags for the
autoregressive equation. Further, we use Newey-West standard errors robust regression
model for estimation. This is done to avoid the serial correlation among the error terms of
the model. The results are discussed in the next section.
Results and Discussion
The regression results are shown in the table below. The table shows that first lag of the
differenced series is positively related to the current period. Similarly, the lag is also
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positively related to the current time period value, but the level of impact is lower that of
the first lag. Both the coefficients are highly statistically significant.
dunemp_conn
L1.
L2.
_cons

Coef.
0.4938265
0.3549381
-0.0002176

Std. Err.
0.047691
0.044718
0.003617

t
10.35
7.94
-0.06

P>t
0
0
0.95

[95% Conf. Int]
0.400097 0.587556
0.267052 0.442824
-0.00733 0.006891

In order to check for the autocorrelation among the error terms, we run the Q- White
Noise test. The null hypothesis in this test is that there is no existence of white noise in
the series. Therefore, a rejection of the null hypothesis shows that the series is not noise
and hence there is no serial correlation. The results of our test reveal a p-value of 0,
which means that we can reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are not white
noise. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no serial correlation among the error
terms.
Armed with a robust model, we now forecast the unemployment rate for the months after
January 2011. The results are shown below.
Month
2011-01-01
2011-02-01
2011-03-01
2011-04-01
2011-05-01
2011-06-01

Unemployment Rate in percent terms
9.40
9.25
9.19
9.14
9.10
9.06

The results show that the unemployment rate will decline in the subsequent months.
However, the rate of decline is very slow. The fall in the unemployment rate could be
attributed to the recovery in the economy. As the national economy and economies
worldwide recover the economic recession of 2008, productive activities will increase
everywhere. The same will apply to Connecticut as well. However, the slow rate of fall in
unemployment means that the economic activity is still not going to be enough. It is here
that the government needs to intervene in the economy and provide impetus to the
improving employment scenario.
Government initiatives in terms of provision for better facilitation of job search, job
creation through infrastructure work and other public welfare expenses in the form of
construction and manufacturing can really provide the push the economy requires.
Providing subsidies to the producers and manufacturers will also help promote productive
activities. These will help generate additional employment opportunity while also boost
demand in the economy.
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III.

Labor Market Developments
by Gregory Ibe, Bradley Pierce

Motivational research is a type of marketing research that attempts to explain why
consumers behave as they do or in this case what the labor market outlook is for the
state of Connecticut for 2013. The data for this research project was obtained on
several websites one being the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Because this for
the labor market development outlook for the state of Connecticut for the year 2013
I only went back to 22 years to 1990 even going back this far I had some trouble
finding some of the data.

Job Openings in the North East:
This variable will give us the percentages of job openings in the northeast. The more
job openings there was in the northeast the better the labor market would be in
Connecticut. I could not find job openings for the state of Connecticut alone so I
went with the next best option, which was the northeast. The minimum for this was
2% and the maximum was 3.1%.

Connecticut Lending:
This stat comes down to the percentage that banks are lending in the state of
Connecticut. We believe that the more lending there is the more businesses are
working and creating more jobs for people. The minimum was -1.47 percent and the
maximum was 1.5 percent.

Population:
Population is the amount of people that are living the in state of Connecticut. The
more people are living in an area the more people will use the resources around
their area , which will create revenue for local businesses and lead to more hiring of
employees. The minimum was 3433 in thousands of persons and the maximum was
3591 in thousands of persons.

Unemployment Benefits:
After the recession many people were hired and laid off that lead to a spike in the
amount of benefits they were receiving. This variable shows the amount of money
that the State Government of Connecticut has given out yearly. We think that the
more people are receiving in benefits the less the will be pressed to look for a job.
The minimum for this was 486 and the maximum was 2396.
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Our Analytical Model:
In this model that is composed it will show the significance that is between my
dependent and independent variables.
Labor Market (employment) = Y-value
The State of Connecticut Lending (CT_lending) = b1
The percentage of job openings in the northeast (job_openings_NE) = b2
The Population of the State of Connecticut (population) = b3
The amount of unemployment benefits given out by the state of Connecticut
(unemployment_benefits) = b4

Our hypothesis for our project is that the labor market is on the upward swing. Our
country is slowly getting out of a recession that hit our labor market and brought
the state unemployment of Connecticut to a high what hasn’t been seen in decades.

Variables

Expected

Actual

Connecticut Lending
Job Openings in North East
Population
Unemployment Benefits

Positive
Positive
Positive
Negative

Negative
Positive
Positive
Negative

Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Std. Dev.
Skewness
Kurtosis

CT_LENDING
0.605833
1.110000
1.500000
-1.470000
1.079069
-0.960919
2.361660

JOB_OPENINGS_NE POPULATION
2.525000
3523.731
2.500000
3522.365
3.100000
3590.347
2.000000
3432.835
0.304884
50.68856
0.295253
-0.257709
2.521057
2.024332

UNEMPLOYMENT_
BENEFITS
1101.250
838.5000
2396.000
486.0000
693.7409
0.809192
2.062747

Jarque-Bera
Probability

2.050472
0.358712

0.289042
0.865437

0.608792
0.737569

1.748807
0.417111

Sum
Sum Sq. Dev.

7.270000
12.80829

30.30000
1.022500

42284.77
28262.63

13215.00
5294040.

Observations

12

12

12

12
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Dependent Variable: EMPLOYMENT
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/01/13 Time: 22:31
Sample (adjusted): 12 23
Included observations: 12 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
CT_LENDING
JOB_OPENINGS_NE
POPULATION
UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS

701.0139
-11.72504
34.87447
0.260548
-0.039436

324.2457
2.979102
14.89634
0.092494
0.008102

2.161983
-3.935764
2.341143
2.816925
-4.867445

0.0674
0.0056
0.0518
0.0259
0.0018

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.926977
0.885250
10.03554
704.9848
-41.46688
22.21511
0.000447

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

1656.642
29.62540
7.744480
7.946524
7.669676
1.781052

Dependent Variable: EMPLOYMENT
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution
Date: 05/01/13 Time: 23:29
Sample (adjusted): 12 23
Included observations: 12 after adjustments
Convergence achieved after 29 iterations
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7)
GARCH = C(6) + C(7)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(8)*GARCH(-1)
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

z-Statistic

Prob.

C
CT_LENDING
JOB_OPENINGS_NE
POPULATION
UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS

700.4858
-12.29407
35.17249
0.261625
-0.040481

290.9314
5.070168
11.04172
0.084662
0.008049

2.407735
-2.424786
3.185417
3.090213
-5.029351

0.0161
0.0153
0.0014
0.0020
0.0000

0.407773
-0.329791
0.637437

0.6834
0.7416
0.5238

Variance Equation
C
RESID(-1)^2
GARCH(-1)
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
Durbin-Watson stat

Pairwise Granger Causality Tests

42.78225
-0.891226
1.213832
0.918062
0.871240
10.63053
791.0572
-40.17435
1.672751

104.9168
2.702397
1.904239

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.

1656.642
29.62540
8.029059
8.352330
7.909372

21
Date: 05/01/13 Time: 23:36
Sample: 1 23
Lags: 2
Null Hypothesis:

Obs

F-Statistic

Prob.

JOB_OPENINGS_NE does not Granger Cause CT_LENDING
CT_LENDING does not Granger Cause JOB_OPENINGS_NE

10

0.56981
0.58179

0.5985
0.5927

POPULATION does not Granger Cause CT_LENDING
CT_LENDING does not Granger Cause POPULATION

21

3.21186
0.56241

0.0672
0.5807

UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS does not Granger Cause CT_LENDING
CT_LENDING does not Granger Cause UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS

21

0.36609
16.4341

0.6991
0.0001

POPULATION does not Granger Cause JOB_OPENINGS_NE
JOB_OPENINGS_NE does not Granger Cause POPULATION

10

5.21066
3.04275

0.0599
0.1366

UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS does not Granger Cause JOB_OPENINGS_NE
JOB_OPENINGS_NE does not Granger Cause UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS

10

0.55177
0.19126

0.6074
0.8317

UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS does not Granger Cause POPULATION
POPULATION does not Granger Cause UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS

21

0.34586
2.28000

0.7128
0.1345

Scatter Plot
The Graph shows a decreasing trend in the lending as the GDP grows and a very
stable taxes in Connecticut. The decline in Lending in Ct can’t be a good sign for the
development of jobs because in order to increase in size, companies need to borrow
funds and being that the taxes have been stable in terms of its percentage change
from year to year, the lending shouldn’t show such a drastic downward trend with
the increase of GDP as stated in earlier OLS regression.
3

2

1
CT lending
DLOG(CT_TAXES)
0

-1
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Unit Root test
Null Hypothesis: EMPLOYMENT has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=4)

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-2.633649
-3.788030
-3.012363
-2.646119

0.1023

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Employment- It isn’t significant at a 5% level with the ADF test, but becomes
significant when differenced by 1.
Null Hypothesis: JOB_OPENINGS_NE has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=2)

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-2.428241
-4.297073
-3.212696
-2.747676

0.1583

Job Opening in Northeast was insignificant at level and barely became significant at
a 5% level when differenced.
Null Hypothesis: POPULATION has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 0 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=4)

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

0.063562
-3.769597
-3.004861
-2.642242

0.9550

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.

Population as expected was very insignificant at level which accepts the Null but
surprisingly when differenced became significant at the 5% level.
Null Hypothesis: UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
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Lag Length: 1 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=4)

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:

1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-2.379202
-3.788030
-3.012363
-2.646119

0.1590

Unemployment Benefits also proves to be the same as the 3 listed above.
RECALIBRATED OLS MODEL.
(differenced)
Dependent Variable: D(EMPLOYMENT)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/02/13 Time: 00:42
Sample (adjusted): 13 23
Included observations: 11 after adjustments
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
CT_LENDING
D(JOB_OPENINGS_NE)
D(POPULATION)
D(UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS)

9.789584
-5.462785
12.36907
-0.294558
-0.053477

14.81692
10.56736
34.53246
1.104290
0.018010

0.660703
-0.516949
0.358187
-0.266740
-2.969370

0.5333
0.6237
0.7325
0.7986
0.0250

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.805832
0.676387
15.58144
1456.688
-42.48146
6.225271
0.025017

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

-3.845455
27.39016
8.632993
8.813855
8.518986
1.028312

The Optimized stationary model even though has decent robustness in the Adjusted
R-squared, it shows every coefficient to be insignificant possibly signaling some
serial correlation.
The addition of ARMA to help create a better forecast is needed as the chart details
the ARMA (1,1) model due to the small sample size of our observation.
ARMA
MA(0)
MA(1)

AR(0)
8.632993

7.895812

AR(1)
8.688251
7.7704323

After running the model, ARMA(1,1) produced the lowest AIC and also had the
highest log-likelihood making it a staple in or regression but, we still are presented
with a rather insufficient model as the coefficients all still remain insignificant.
Dependent Variable: D(EMPLOYMENT)
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Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/02/13 Time: 00:57
Sample (adjusted): 14 23
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Failure to improve SSR after 24 iterations
MA Backcast: 13
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

C
CT_LENDING
D(JOB_OPENINGS_NE)
D(POPULATION)
D(UNEMPLOYMENT_BENEFITS)
AR(1)
MA(1)

-4.489547
-3.027181
15.34361
0.503949
-0.055986
0.517737
0.997033

16.85900
7.739927
12.45254
1.303146
0.011103
0.656230
0.622011

-0.266300
-0.391112
1.232167
0.386717
-5.042303
0.788957
1.602918

0.8073
0.7218
0.3057
0.7248
0.0150
0.4877
0.2073

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.953337
0.860011
10.67884
342.1128
-31.85216
10.21515
0.041671

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

-2.600000
28.54155
7.770432
7.982242
7.538078
1.380456

Forcasted model with ARMA (1,1)- Examining this shows the regular model to be
the slightly better forecast because of the lower bias proportion, variance
proportion and covariance proportion. The forecasts both show high volatility in its
trends as it could either drown the workforce by 300000 workers or gain the same.
1,900

Forecast: EMPLOYMENTF
Actual: EMPLOYMENT
Forecast sample: 1 23
Adjusted sample: 14 23
Included observations: 10
Root Mean Squared Error
Mean Absolute Error
Mean Abs. Percent Error
Theil Inequality Coefficient
Bias Proportion
Variance Proportion
Covariance Proportion

1,800

1,700

1,600

1,500

1,400

1,300
14

15

16

17

18

19

EMPLOYMENTF

20

21

± 2 S.E.

22

23

33.95693
29.93642
1.813388
0.010341
0.484405
0.079467
0.436128
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REGULAR MODEL
1,800

Forecast: EMPLOYMENTF
Actual: EMPLOYMENT
Forecast sample: 1 23
Adjusted sample: 13 23
Included observations: 11
Root Mean Squared Error
Mean Absolute Error
Mean Abs. Percent Error
Theil Inequality Coefficient
Bias Proportion
Variance Proportion
Covariance Proportion

1,750
1,700
1,650
1,600
1,550

17.69925
14.57497
0.877825
0.005364
0.283348
0.000233
0.716419

1,500
1,450
13

14

15

16

17

18

EMPLOYMENTF

19

20

21

22

23

± 2 S.E.

CONCLUSIONOur concluding formula would be:
D(employment)= 9.78958C -5.4627LENDING +12.369 D(JOB Op)0.294D(population)-0.0534D(UNEMPBEN)
The data was hard to acquire to implement a significant forecast especially being
that some of the coefficients weren’t recorded therefore making it hard for our
coefficients to be significant. However, must of our hypothesis in the end the
mindset in which we had in mind stuck through with the exception of lending. The
CT state department seems to think that the annual employment growth from 2010
until 2020 will 1876 jobs. In order for that to happen, the lending as a result of high
GDP output by the state have to keep on its trend of reducing. The less we lend in CT
the more companies have at their exposal to employ someone instead of pay the
bills. The Unemployment rate of course with its inverse relationship to employment
has to continue to reduce. The population is a tricky one because the availability of
people usually means more competition and more people employed, but also means
that more people go unemployed, therefore leaving a quandary for the labor
markets. Finally Job opportunities has to grow, which goes alongside the lending,
because when companies don’t have debt to pay, they are willing to employ
additional staff in order to expand rather than contract. The graph of employment
had been showing a drastic downward trend, but due to the recent economic surge
CT was able to bounce back from the horrendous recessionary periods only to see
high levels of increase in the labor force.
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IV. State Budget Revenue Outlook
by Salvatore Cerami, John Chiarelli, Frank Howard

Dependent Variable: REV
Method: Least Squares
Date: 05/01/13 Time: 21:00
Sample: 1 15
Included observations: 15
Variable

Coefficient

C
LGUMP
WAGE
GDP
PCPI

22.21309
-3.014251
-0.000968
0.000224
0.000795

R-squared
0.585867
Adjusted R-squared 0.420214
S.E. of regression
0.832601
Sum squared resid
6.932242
Log likelihood
-15.49508
F-statistic
3.536710
Prob(F-statistic)
0.047865

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

3.096298 7.174079
1.091169 -2.762406
0.000267 -3.621774
0.000101 2.223316
0.000341 2.335491
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

0.0000
0.0200
0.0047
0.0504
0.0417
13.41133
1.093460
2.732677
2.968693
2.730163
2.596428

Dependent Variable: REV
Method: ML - ARCH (Marquardt) - Normal distribution
Date: 05/01/13 Time: 21:35
Sample: 1 15
Included observations: 15
Convergence achieved after 23 iterations
Presample variance: backcast (parameter = 0.7)
GARCH = C(6) + C(7)*RESID(-1)^2 + C(8)*GARCH(-1)
Variable

Coefficient

C
LGUMP
WAGE
GDP
PCPI

21.97813
-2.830454
-0.000875
0.000235
0.000581

Std. Error

z-Statistic

3.112013 7.062352
0.960466 -2.946959
0.000213 -4.101757
0.000159 1.480451
0.000573 1.014041

Variance Equation

Prob.
0.0000
0.0032
0.0000
0.1388
0.3106
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C
RESID(-1)^2
GARCH(-1)

-0.035609
-0.210462
1.520009

R-squared
0.564600
Adjusted R-squared 0.390441
S.E. of regression
0.853711
Sum squared resid
7.288229
Log likelihood
-11.71037
F-statistic
1.852487
Prob(F-statistic)
0.181604

0.113077 -0.314912
1.025573 -0.205214
1.348913 1.126840
Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

0.7528
0.8374
0.2598
13.41133
1.093460
2.628049
3.005676
2.624027
2.617454

The regressions that we ran provided some results that help us in understanding
the effects of the independent variables on state revenue. We ran a regression using the
least squares method, this provides some accurate results because it eliminates the effect
of missing variables or an incomplete sample. When analyzing the regression we noticed
a couple of things that give us very good insights on this model. Both unemployment and
wage had an indirect correlation with the state revenue. As the unemployment increased
by 1%, the state revenue decreased by 2.38%. This is to be expected because
unemployment has always been a big indicator of the how a country or state or
performing financially. When running the T-test we could see that this variable is
significant in the 95% level. When analyzing the wage variable we can see the indirect
correlation of this and the state revenue. The impact of it was not as big as the one with
unemployment because it had a very small coefficient of -0.00096. However this has the
bias that we expected and it also was significant at the 99% level. Even thou it has a very
small coefficient it should not be ignored because when running sensitivity tests its
impact in the model were noticeable. The next two variables had a positive correlation
with state revenue. This all had the bias that we predicted because as GDP and PCPI go
up the state revenue is expected to go up. Like expected these variables also had small
coefficients, because there are many other variables in the model that are not being
measured in this study. What is important to point out is that we got the bias that we
expected, both of them were significant at a 95% level, and we can get an estimate to see
how it affects state revenue. We got an R^2 of .58 which means our model does indeed
represent a good portion of what happens in reality. We had hope to get a little higher
than this but it is to be expected when running a regression that has so many variables.

The next regression we ran was using the ML - ARCH model. This is very useful
when running a model were the data constantly change. We decided that it would be good
for us to run the model because it would take care of some uncertainties created by our
original one. When we analyze it we can see that that we got very similar results than the
regressions previously discussed. The bias for both unemployment and wages was what
we expected, both of them had a negative correlation once again with unemployment
having a very big coefficient of 2.83%. When looking at the z scores we could see that
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both of them were highly significant with extremely good provability scores. The next
two variables GDP and PCPI both gave us the expected result having a direct correlation
with state revenue. Similarly to the least square model they both had small coefficients,
however we could see that the variable were not as significant as we had hoped they were
a little bit over the 10% level. These are not bad scores and we decided that the impacts
of our variables do need to be considered when running the model. The R^2 was .57;
which is to be expected and it shows that the model we ran is accurate, but could use a
few other variables.

16

Forecast: REVF
Actual: REV
Forecast sample: 1 15
Included observations: 15
Root Mean Squared Error
Mean Absolute Error
Mean Abs. Percent Error
Theil Inequality Coefficient
Bias Proportion
Variance Proportion
Covariance Proportion

15
14
13
12
11

0.697052
0.508701
3.918897
0.025947
0.000732
0.236467
0.762801

10
2

4

6
REVF

.2

8

10

12

14

±2 S.E.

This next graph we found to be extremely useful and surprisingly accurate. Here we
forecast our Revenue as a percentage of state GDP within 2 standard deviations of
forecast. What we find most interesting about this graph is the year in which our data
takes a significant dip. Ten years into our graph our government revenue sharply starts to
tumble downward. It comes to no surprise that these were the start of the recessionary
years for the United States of America and the state of Connecticut also felt its impact.
There are a few reasons for this downward spiral. First off we can blame the
unemployment rate. As our data shows, the unemployment rate for the state was at 4.6 in
the year 2007. At the 10 value on the horizontal axis of our graph you see that our REV
number is at highest. What also should be noted is our other variables were also at their
highest during this time period. Per capita personal income(55,859) and GDP for the state
of CT (221,133,000) were at their climax. During the next 3 years unemployment jumped
from 4.6 to 9.3 in 2010. This was the highest unemployment has ever been in the state
and is showed by the minimum point in our graph at the 13 year mark. The Department
of Labor showed there were 119,000 publically lost jobs in the state, with an additional
16,000 state jobs lost. At its low point, which came in the fourth quarter of 2009, was
supposed to be a GDP of $204.5 billion. But new data show the state's rock bottom of
economic output was actually about 7 percent lower, coming in just above $190 billion.
Our numbers that you see in the chart to the right show a Theil Inequality Coefficient of
0.0259. As a rule, the closer this number is to zero, the more accurate a projection is. We
are pleased with this number and believe that our graph not only shows a correlation to
Connecticut’s economic health but the nations as well. As you may have noticed the REV
number is creeping back upward and today it is back to the 1997 level. As for the future
we remain unsure about the future of the CT state revenue for many reasons however one
statistic is holds our hopes at rest. The job market in CT is not growing. Over the past 2
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decades the job market has only grown 1.8%, and today there are fewer jobs in CT than
there were in 1988. In order to boost our revenue number we would have to entice the
citizens to spend or raise taxes. With little to no job creation in the coming 18 months,
according to Governor Dannel Malloy, "The new understanding of the depths from which
we are recovering re-enforces ... the absolute necessity for Connecticut to pursue
aggressive policies and sustained investments to accelerate recovery and job creation"
says Malloy. For this we believe our graph to be accurate and expect a leveling off of
growth for the State revenue budget for Connecticut.

Null Hypothesis: REV has a unit root
Exogenous: Constant
Lag Length: 3 (Automatic based on SIC, MAXLAG=3)

Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic
Test critical values:
1% level
5% level
10% level

t-Statistic

Prob.*

-3.953914
-4.200056
-3.175352
-2.728985

0.0147

*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
Warning: Probabilities and critical values calculated for 20 observations
In order to find out whether or not our data was stationary or non-stationary we
had to perform a unit root test on our dependent variable REV (state revenue as a
percentage of Connecticut’s GDP). It is important to know this because it depends
on what kind of testing we can perform on our variables. When data is stationary we
can use OLS (ordinary least squared) testing. When data is non-stationary we would
need to transform the data by differencing. To find out what type of data we have we
chose to do an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF). According to our results we
would reject the null hypothesis at the 5% and 10% levels. We can say this for sure
because our t-statistical calculated values at theselevels(-3.175 and -2.7289) are
bigger larger than the t-critical value of -3.953. Our conclusion that our REV
variable is stationary is further verified by our p-value of .0147. This number
signifies that our data is stationary at the 5% level.

In terms of the current state budget outlook in Connecticut, two very crucial areas of
focus are noted as “rising revenues and shrinking expenditures.” Furthermore, in terms
of monitoring this outlook, another focal area will be noted on April 15th when the states
reviews tax filings, while will represent the position of the economy statewide.
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Another note on this outlook comes from the level of spending statewide during this
fiscal year. “Lembo noted that spending growth has been minimal for most of the current
fiscal year, and that effort is helping to diminish the red ink”.
Furthermore, sales tax, income tax, and other tax receipts should not drop below
expectations for the sale of improving Connecticut’s budget outlook. Another proposal
for the sake of improving this current condition will come as a result of spending cuts.
“Primarily to social services, new tax revenues from businesses, power plants, and
spending” .
Another reliable good source of information relative to this project came from Tom
Foley. His input here will support the presence of our GDP variable. Foley states that he
“expected 40% of the problem – about 1.5 Billion – to be solved economic growth alone.
Income sales and other taxes would raise more because additional people would be
working, getting raises, and spending more”.
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V.

The Housing Market: Expecting a Rebound?
by James D’Elia, Dominick Livia

Technical Analysis of the Connecticut Housing Market
Internal Analysis of Connecticut Housing Market
Historically speaking, the Connecticut housing market has flourished in
relation to the United States housing market. However, in recent years the housing
market has taken a serious hit, primarily in thanks to the housing bubble of 2008,
which ultimately lead to an economic recession. The effects of this recession were
noticeable across the entire housing market, as it affected housing starts, home
ownership, home vacancy and housing prices. While Connecticut seemed to fair
better than the rest of the United States, due to its wealth as a state (consistently
ranked in the top 5 in median household income), it was not able to escape the
housing bubble unscathed.

One area where Connecticut has seen a visible decline is the area of privately
owned housing starts. Since the year 2007, Connecticut has seen a 56% decrease in
privately owned housing starts (annually). Even more alarming is that there was a
visible decline even before the housing crisis, as from 2002 through 2007 there was
a 38% decrease in new housing starts. It is clear that Connecticut housing starts
were already on a declining path, and that this housing bubble seemed to accelerate
this downward movement. Additionally, the Connecticut privately owned housing
starts market appears to have positive correlation with the United States privately
owned housing starts market. Since 2006, every year the United States market
appreciated, so did the Connecticut market, and every year that the United States
market depreciated, so did the Connecticut. This is significant, because if the United
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States housing market as a whole does not rebound, than one cannot expect
Connecticut’s market to have a significant rebound either.

Recently, Connecticut has experienced unfamiliar growth is in the home
vacancy rate. The average home vacancy rate from 1986 through 2004 in
Connecticut was 1.4, and for the United States it was 1.6. In 2005, the home vacancy
rate for Connecticut was 1.3%, and the United States home vacancy rate was 1.9%.
However, since 2005 it has risen to 2.2% in Connecticut (peaking at 2.3% since the
housing bubble) and 2.5% Nationally (peaking at 2.8% during the housing bubble).
These may seem insignificant, but they are appreciations of 69% in Connecticut and
32% in the United States. If the home vacancy rates continue to appreciate at this
level, it will not bode well for the Connecticut housing market, as well as the United
States housing market as a whole. More vacant homes will create a market surplus,
and drive down housing prices even further, something that the market can ill
afford to experience. However, the depreciation in home prices should help return
the home vacancy rates to equilibrium, as the availability of affordable homes will
allow higher occupancy.
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Perhaps the most significant issues Connecticut has faced are within the
House Price Index. Historically, Connecticut has ranked in the upper echelon of
states in terms of housing prices. Over the last 37 years, Connecticut homes have
been priced 23% above the national average, peaking at 78% in the late 1980’s.
From 1975 through 2007, Connecticut averaged a 7% annual inflation in housing
prices, and only experienced 7 years of deflation in the housing price index.
Additionally, these 7 years of deflation maintained low levels, often around 1-2%.
However, since 2007, Connecticut has experienced deflation in housing prices
during every single year, averaging -4% annually. This has seen the housing price
index drop from 469.10 to 392.21 (a 16.4% decline). Connecticut is not alone in this
dilemma, as the national housing price index has also seen significant deflation. In
2007, the national housing price index maintained a level of 375.73. Since 2007, this
number has depreciated to 314.22, a decline of 16.3%. This is primarily due to the
housing bubble and recent economic recession. However, this is extremely
significant, because it shows that while Connecticut housing prices have historically
experienced superior inflation relative to the national housing price index, during
times of economic hardship Connecticut is susceptible to the same deflation as the
rest of the nation. This does not bode well for Connecticut, as the national housing
market has yet to show signs of a rebound any time soon.
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The final section analyzed within the technical analysis is the Connecticut
home ownership rate. Since 1984, Connecticut has maintained an average home
ownership rate of 68.9%. In comparison, the United States home ownership rate
during the same time span is 66.0%, further solidifying Connecticut’s superiority in
the housing market. Surprisingly, Connecticut’s Home Ownership rates have seen
little depreciation due to the recent housing bubble. In 2007, the Connecticut home
ownership rate was 70.3%. Since then, Connecticut has actually seen an
appreciation in the home ownership rate, reaching 70.6% in 2011. This could be
attribute to housing prices falling, making it easier and more affordable for people
to live in Connecticut. However, the national home ownership rates did not share
the same success. In 2007 the national home ownership rate reached 68.1%, above
the historical average. However, since 2007 it has depreciated every year and is now
at 66.1%.
External Analysis of the Connecticut Housing Market
While there are several internal factors that drive the Connecticut housing
market, there are other external factors that also play a huge role in the efficiency of
the market. These factors include Gross Domestic Product, Unemployment Rates,
United States Mortgage Rates, and Per Capita Disposable Income. Historically, when
these elements are in cohesion, the United States Housing Market has thrived, as
well as Connecticut’s. However, recently several of these factors have been thrown
out of equilibrium, primarily due to the housing crisis of 2008.

35

One factor that is essential to not only the housing market, but the entire
economy of the United States & Connecticut is the Gross Domestic Product. Gross
Domestic Product can be defined as the output of goods and services produced by
labor and property located in the United States. Perhaps the most significant
measure of Gross Domestic Product is the GDP Growth rate on an annual basis, as it
represents the level at which a company is improving its Gross Domestic Product
and expanding itself economically. Historically speaking, both the United States and
Connecticut has enjoyed high levels of GDP Growth. From 1997 through 2007, the
United States has sustained average GDP growth of 5.35% (Seasonally Adjusted),
and Connecticut has sustained an average GDP growth of 4.92% (Seasonally
Adjusted). However, since the crisis of 2008, that level has plummeted to 1.85% for
the United States and 1.04% for Connecticut. Additionally, there is little optimism
that the United States will ever get back to the high 5.35% levels that it maintained
in the past, meaning that the housing market may never experience a significant
rebound to where it was 10 years ago.

Another essential factor to both the economy and the housing market is the
unemployment rate. Unemployment measures the rate of workforce members who
are unemployed and actively seeking jobs. Historically, when economies have
performed well, the unemployment rate exhibits a natural rate, consisting only
frictional and structural unemployment (essentially, unavoidable unemployment).
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In the United States, the historical average for unemployment since 1976 is 6.5%.
However, this has not been a steady 6.5%, as there has been much fluctuating of this
rate, peaking at 10.8% in the early 1980’s and dropping to as low as 3.8% in 2000.
However, recently we have seen a rise in unemployment, as since the crisis of 2008
we have seen an average unemployment rate of 8.7%, and a current rate of 7.6% in
March of 2013. To put this into perspective, in the 10 years approaching the crisis,
the highest level of unemployment in the United States was 6.3%, with an average of
4.9%. While Connecticut has historically maintained lower levels of unemployment
than the United States (5.4% since 1976) the state was not able to escape the crisis
of 2008 unharmed. Since the crisis of 2008, Connecticut has maintained an average
unemployment rate of 8.4%, three percentage points higher than its historical
average. However, Connecticut has seen a downward trend in unemployment
levels, as unemployment now stands at 8.0% in March 2013. If this trend can
continue, it bodes well for Connecticut, because if employment rises, the need for
homes will rise as well.

The external force that is most closely related to the housing market is the
United States Mortgage Rate. Mortgage Rates are often a function of several
economic factors, such as inflation, interest rates, GDP, unemployment rates,
behavior of equity and bond markets, CPI and PPI. Taking all this into consideration,
the United States has historically held much higher home mortgage rates than it
does today. However, while low rates may allow people easier access to homes, the
lower rates do not guarantee success for the market. In March 2013, the United
States 30-year mortgage rate was 3.57%, well below the historical average of 8.64%.
However, due to extremely low interest rates (10 Year-Treasury Rate of 1.66%)
coupled with a significant decline in the ease to obtain a mortgage loan, the market
has not been able to benefit from these low rates. These mortgage rates are
expected to remain low in the near future, allowing for a potential rebound if
economic conditions strengthen.
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The final external factor analyzed is the Per Capita Disposable Income. In
theory, the more disposable income people hold, the better the housing market
performs, as houses become more affordable. This holds true, as Connecticut has
maintained Disposable Income Rates 25.6% higher than the national average since
1959, leading to a superior housing market. Recently this discrepancy has become
even more apparent, as Connecticut has been above 30% over the national average
since 2006. This bodes well for Connecticut ,as they seem like the most likely
candidate (if any) to experience a rebound in the housing market, due to their
abundance of disposable wealth.

Fundamental Analysis of Housing Market in Connecticut
Overall, Connecticut has managed to sustain some success in the early goings
of 2013. In the first quarter of 2013, pending sales of single-family homes rose
17.1% over the first quarter of 2012. While 2012 was one of the worst years in
recent memory, its is significant to note that the market is beginning to rebound.
Additionally, deposits on condominiums rose 29% to 1790 contracts, which is the
highest total in the last three years. This is vital, as it signifies that the drop in price
for homes in Connecticut is finally met by an increased demand (sales up 8.8% from
a year ago), positive signs for the market. In addition to this, recently financial
institutions have began approving more housing loans. While the “zero down
payment” loan is most likely extinct, loans will be more accessible to the average
person. Median prices in Connecticut have also stabilized in the first quarter, due to
a full year of consistent growth in both the number of deposits and the number of
closings. This consistent growth is the key to prices approaching levels of
equilibrium, and it remains to be seen if this growth can be maintained for
successive years.
While there were several positive market movements from the first quarter
of 2013, there also were several negative indicators. Even though single-family
home sales rose and condominium deposits rose, the rental market took a hit, with
rental leases dropping by 2.6%. This possibly has correlation with the rise in
housing sales, as more people are finally able to afford houses due to the low prices.
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Additionally, foreclosures in Connecticut continued to rise, as they have the 7th
highest rate in the country, and 2nd in New England behind Maine. Lastly,
Connecticut’s luxury market has remained unchanged, thus furthering the theory
that people are seeking the most affordable homes in Connecticut. If the demand for
affordable homes continues to rise, than eventually so will housing prices, and the
market will correct itself. This self-correction could stunt the growth within the
housing market in Connecticut and lead to further issues.

Forecast of the Connecticut Housing Market
As a whole, there are both positive indicators and negative indicators
surrounding the state of the Connecticut Housing Market. Internally, Connecticut
appears to be in significantly better shape than the United States in terms of
Housing. However, that is not very significant, as both are still feeling the ill effects
of the crisis of 2008. Externally, the United States is not where it should be
economically, and until it sustains any form of long-term success, any excessive
optimism must be curbed. However, positive signs are present so far in 2013, as the
stock market has performed well (S&P 500 up near record highs of $1,597), the
United States Dollar has appreciated significantly, Unemployment is down in April
(7.5%) due to the creation of 165,000 jobs and the housing market seems to be
heading in the right direction. Fundamentally, Connecticut has shown signs of
rebounding, but these rebounds are in very small sample sizes, and must be
maintained in order to consider Connecticut’s Housing Market Stable.
Based on all these factors, one cannot expect any significant growth in
Connecticut’s Housing Market in the near future. A more realistic expectation would
be slight growth in 2013, stimulated by lower unemployment rates, lower housing
prices, GDP Growth, high levels of disposable income, an improved single-family
home market and increased deposits on condominiums. This slight growth in 2013
would most likely be followed by increased confidence in the years following, which
could stimulate a significant rebound in the Housing Market. All of this is growth is
dependent on the state of the United States Economy, which appears to be
recovering at a slow pace.
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The Financial Sector: Connecticut’s Comparative Advantage?
by Vincent D’Agnese & Gregory Nunn
Employment in National Commercial Banks:
Employment in national commercial banks rose from 1.719 billion
employees in 2002 to 1.961 employees currently today. Over this ten-year span, we
saw an increase of 14% in national commercial bank employment.
Employment in Connecticut Commercial Banks:
Employment in Connecticut commercial banks rose from 1.224 million
employees in 2002 to 4.094 employees currently today. Over this ten-year span, we
saw an increase of 234% in Connecticut commercial bank employment.

Total Bank Assets in National Commercial Banks:
Total national commercial bank assets were 6.488 trillion dollars in 2002,
compared to 13.391 trillion currently today. Over this ten year span, we saw total
bank assets in national commercial banks rise 106%.

Total Bank Assets in Connecticut Commercial Banks:

40
Total Connecticut commercial bank assets were 3.932 billion in 2002,
compared to 27.176 billion currently today. Over this ten year span, we saw total
bank assets in Connecticut commercial banks rise 591%.

What does this mean?
Over the past ten years we have seen a robust increase in assets among all
commercial banks in the United States. This increase is a direct cause from a weaker
supply of credit within commercial banks. Since the recent financial crisis in 2008,
we have seen a weaker credit supply for mortgage loans as well as declining interest
rates across the board. This activity may suggest an end to some of the asset
dumping that took place during the recession, when banks that chased growth as
they made loans and collected deposits, freeze.
As total bank assets soared, we saw the United States government step in and
adopt a few programs that were designed to strengthen the financial sector. In 2008,
President George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) into
law. This program, as well as the Quantitative Easing Programs that we have seen,
are simply components of government measures to address the subprime mortgage
crisis.

Simple Leverage Ratio in National Commercial Banks:
Simple leverage was measured by total bank assets to total equity capital.
Throughout 2002 to 2004 we saw 10x leverage among national commercial banks.
Since then, national commercial banks are currently leveraged at 8.91x.

Simple Leverage Ratio in Connecticut Commercial Banks:
Connecticut commercial banks have averaged right around 8x leverage
throughout the past ten years. We have seen a slight increase in Connecticut
commercial leverage currently hanging around 9.92x leveraged.

National vs. Connecticut:
Connecticut banks are more leveraged when compared to that of national
banks and it would be correct to assume that Connecticut banks may be more
exposed to interest rate risk. If the Federal Reserve were to raise interest rates,
Connecticut banks will most likely suffer a sharper decline in assets compared to
that of national commercial banks simply because they are highly leveraged.

Solvency Indication:
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Since the recent financial crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the financial
crisis currently experienced by U.S. commercial banks was one of solvency. Solvency
is often referred to as solvency risk and is what banks consider long-term viability.
If a commercial bank takes on bad loans or its security portfolio declines in value,
then its capital accounts, which are designed to absorb these losses, become
stressed. As investors and depositors become aware that this is going on, they may
withdraw their funds and the bank will become insolvent and most likely fail.
Solvency among commercial banks was measure by comparing tier 1 capital to risk
weighted assets. It could also be calculated by tier 1 & 2 capital to total risk
weighted assets.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued Basel II and Basel III
scenarios, which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations. These
were intended to create an international standard for banking regulators to control
how much capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and
operational risks banks face.

National vs. Connecticut:
Nationally, we have seen an increase in solvency over the past ten years from
10% to 12.8% currently. In the state of Connecticut we have seen a decrease in
solvency that peeked in late 2003 at around 19% to its current level of 13.6%.
Solvency is trending downward in Connecticut when compared to that of national
commercial banks. From these numbers, we can see that commercial banks are
meeting Basel III requirements, but barely. There is still room for improvement in
solvency among commercial banks.
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Tier 1 capital is the core measure of a bank’s financial strength from a
regulator’s point of view. This is composed of core capital, which consists primarily
of common stock and retained earnings.

Asset Quality:
Asset quality in commercial banks is calculated from taking non-current
loans and leases to total bank assets. Nationally, we saw a peak in asset quality in
2010 before dropping down to its current level of 1.91%. In the state of Connecticut
we also saw asset quality peak in 2010 before falling to its current level of 1.2%.
National banks currently have a better overall quality of assets than that of banks in
Connecticut.
The recent decline in asset quality could be directly attributed to the high
amount of foreclosures as well as the current weak supply of credit among these
institutions. Asset quality has fallen since the crisis due to extravagant lending prior
to the recession.

Connecticut’s People’s United Bank & Webster Bank:
Asset quality and profitability conditions of Connecticut’s two largest banks
outperform those for the average U.S. banks. While the average national ratio of
non-current (past 90 days due) loans to total loans was reported at 3.66% for the
US, it was considerably lower for People’s United Bank at 2.0% and Webster at
1.61% (based on Federal Reserve Bank Regulatory Data for Q4 2012). People’s has
been more profitable than the average national banks, with its net interest margin
(NIM) reaching 3.93% in Q4 2012. At the same time, Webster’s NIM was at 3.35%,
roughly comparable with the national banks’ level of 3.37%.
People’s United Bank is the largest banking institution in the State with its
total assets reaching $30.1 billion. Webster is the second largest with $20.1 billion
of total assets (based on FDIC Q4 2012 data).
Both banks comply with the minimum core (Tier 1) capital to risk-weighted
assets ratio implied by Basel III. The effective minimum core capital ratio is set
forth by the Basel Committee at 11% (6% base ratio, plus both the conservation
buffer and the countercyclical buffer at 2.5%). People’s core capital ratio is currently
at 12.2% (based FDIC Q4 2012 data) and Webster’s at 11.6%. The total capital to
risk weighted assets ratio is set by Basel III at 13% (8% baseline, plus the two
buffers of 2.5%). People’s total capital ratio of 13.1% barely satisfies this minimum
requirement, while Webster fails short of this benchmark with its ratio of 12.8%.
Moreover, Webster funding sources rely more heavily on borrowed funds than on
deposits. It has 4.99 times more deposits than total borrowings, while the same
multiplier for People’s is 6.75. In essence, People’s depository base is more solid
than Webster’s and its reliance on borrowed funds is less pronounced, which makes
the largest State bank more resilient to possible adverse effects (i.e. the elevated
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interest rate risk) of the departure of the Federal Reserve from its current
quantitative easing policy course at some point in the future.
Worrisome for solvency are also excessive holdings of derivatives by
Webster reaching the level of $9,834 million – considerably higher than People’s
$2,963 million.
In sum, People’s is more profitable and better capitalized than Webster. For
these reasons, it is likely to withstand possible adverse effects of the policy reversal
by the Federal Reserve. However the generally favorable profitability and solvency
conditions of Connecticut’s largest banks will be likely compromised if the Federal
Reserve exits from its current zero-lower-bound interest rate, ultra-easy monetary
policy.

Net Interest Income of Connecticut Banks
Net interest income was calculated by subtracting total interest expense from
total interest income. National commercial bank profitability has risen 64% over the
past ten years compared to an increase of 551% in profitability among Connecticut
commercial banks. Connecticut commercial banks have been more profitable for a
few reasons. Firstly, since the recent financial crisis there has been 483 failed
government assisted banks, zero of which have been in Connecticut. Furthermore,
Connecticut banks saw a lift in interstate lending regulations in 2004 that only
allowed Connecticut banks to lend within the state of Connecticut. Since 2004 we
have seen a huge jump in total interest income within Connecticut commercial
banks.
Commercial banks are most likely to remain profitable after the Federal
Reserve announced on May 1st 2013 that they will continue their asset purchasing
program of purchasing $85 billion of treasuries and mortgage-backed securities
each month into 2014.

Summary:
Over the past ten years, we have seen a steady increase in employment
within the commercial banking sector. National employment is up 14% in these
institutions while Connecticut employment is up 235%. We have seen a robust
increase in assets among all commercial banks in the United States. This increase is
a direct cause from a weaker supply of credit within commercial banks. Since the
recent financial crisis in 2008, we have seen a weaker credit supply for mortgage
loans as well as declining interest rates across the board. This activity may suggest
an end to some of the asset dumping that took place during the recession, when
banks that chased growth as they made loans and collected deposits, freeze.
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As total bank assets soared, we saw the United States government step in and
adopt a few programs that were designed to strengthen the financial sector. In 2008,
President George W. Bush signed the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) into
law. This program, as well as the Quantitative Easing Programs that we have seen,
are simply components of government measures to address the subprime mortgage
crisis.
Since the recent financial crisis, it is reasonable to assume that the financial
crisis currently experienced by U.S. commercial banks was one of solvency. Solvency
is often referred to as solvency risk and is what banks consider long-term viability.
If a commercial bank takes on bad loans or its security portfolio declines in value,
then its capital accounts, which are designed to absorb these losses, become
stressed. As investors and depositors become aware that this is going on, they may
withdraw their funds and the bank will become insolvent and most likely fail. The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued Basel II and Basel III scenarios,
which are recommendations on banking laws and regulations. These were intended
to create an international standard for banking regulators to control how much
capital banks need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and
operational risks banks face. Currently, commercial banks are meeting Basel III
standards, but not by much. There is still much more room to increase solvency
within our commercial banks.
Asset quality in commercial banks has decreased substantially since 2010.
Nationally, we saw a peak in asset quality in 2010 before dropping down to its
current level of 1.91%. In the state of Connecticut we also saw asset quality peak in
2010 before falling to its current level of 1.2%. National banks currently have a
better overall quality of assets than that of banks in Connecticut. The recent decline
in asset quality could be directly attributed to the high amount of foreclosures as
well as the current weak supply of credit among these institutions. Asset quality has
fallen since the crisis due to extravagant lending prior to the recession.
Net interest income has risen among commercial banks as we are seeing
them become more profitable. National commercial bank profitability has risen 64%
over the past ten years compared to an increase of 551% in profitability among
Connecticut commercial banks. Connecticut commercial banks have been more
profitable for a few reasons. Firstly, since the recent financial crisis there has been
483 failed government assisted banks, zero of which have been in Connecticut.
Furthermore, Connecticut banks saw a lift in interstate lending regulations in 2004
that only allowed Connecticut banks to lend within the state of Connecticut. Since
2004 we have seen a huge jump in total interest income within Connecticut
commercial banks.
Commercial banks are most likely to remain profitable after the Federal
Reserve announced on May 1st 2013 that they would continue their asset
purchasing program of purchasing $85 billion of treasuries and mortgage-backed
securities each month into 2014.
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